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Entrepreneurial high growth firms are recognized as having a disproportionate impact on 
economic development and job creation. It is further recognized that many of these firms need 
access to venture capital if the high-growth potential is to be realized. Intervention by 
governments to improve access to finance for entrepreneurial ventures have often focused on 
supply-side measures. However, there is a growing recognition that access to finance can also 
be hindered by weaknesses on the demand-side where entrepreneurs need information and 
advice on the process of raising equity finance and what it means to be investment ready. 
 
This thesis focuses on the demand-side of financing and the entrepreneur’s point of view on 
venture capital. Although there is a vast literature about how venture capitalists (VCs) screen 
and select the entrepreneurial firms they wish to invest in, only a handful of studies have 
examined venture capital investments from an entrepreneur’s perspective. Based on 
interviews with 53 venture capital backed entrepreneurs and a quantitative longitudinal study 
of 273 venture capital backed startups, this thesis aims to better understand the “knowledge 
gap” on the demand-side and how entrepreneurs handle problems and challenges when raising 
and being funded by venture capital.  
 
The findings in this thesis are related to the full venture capital cycle, from the initial selection 
phase, through the investment process to after the exit. In paper ONE and TWO we argue that 
entrepreneurs might be considered as a more active part in the VC-entrepreneur relationship 
than most previous studies have assumed. To avoid the VC’s asymmetric information 
advantage I suggest in paper ONE that the entrepreneurs develop informal tools to mitigate 
potential problems and risks. In paper TWO we show how entrepreneurs in “thin” venture 
capital markets recognize the opportunities that a “thick” venture capital market can provide. 
In paper THREE we propose that entrepreneurs who are in the process of raising venture 
capital have reasons to negotiate around future exit choices with the VC when considering the 
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There are several ways for entrepreneurs to finance their startups. Most entrepreneurial 
ventures use personal savings, internally generated funds or capital from family and friends to 
cover the daily operation of the business (Bhidé, 2003). However, there are certain types of 
start-ups that may have a higher capital needs in the early stage, for example high-tech 
ventures and growth-oriented firms. The high risk-return characteristics for these ventures 
make venture capital funding one of the few possible financial sources.  
 
Entrepreneurial high growth firms are recognized as having a disproportionate impact on 
economic development and job creation (Shane, 2009). It is further recognized that many of 
these firms need to access venture capital if the high-growth potential is to be realized (e.g. 
Davila et al., 2003). Several high profile companies including Apple, Facebook, Skype and 
Microsoft all raised venture capital funding in their early years to boost their growth (Cumming 
and Johan, 2017). With many governments around the world interested in recreating the 
success stories from Silicon Valley, there is substantial interest among scholars, practitioners 
and policy makers on the topic of policies toward venture capital.  
 
Intervention by governments to improve access to finance for entrepreneurial ventures have 
often focused on supply side measures, for example governmental venture capital funds 
(Landström, 2017). However, there is a growing recognition that access to finance can also be 
hindered by weaknesses on the demand-side which is often referred to as lack of investment 
readiness (Mason and Harrison, 2004; Mason and Kwok, 2010; Rasmussen and Sørheim, 
2012). Many entrepreneurs do not know about the role of equity finance or have a negative 
attitude towards this type of financing. They might have limited knowledge about the financial 
markets and how to handle various financial actors. They might also be unaware of what is 
involved in raising external capital and what is required to attract equity investors. 
Consequently, entrepreneurs need information and advice on the advantages and 
disadvantages of raising equity finance and what it means to be investment ready (Mason and 
Kwok, 2010; Rasmussen and Sørheim, 2012). 
 
This thesis concentrates on the demand-side of financing and the entrepreneurs’ point of view 
on venture capital. Entrepreneurs encounter various problems and challenges while 
interacting with venture capital investors, both before they have actually ensured that they will 
get funding and during the investment period when entrepreneurs and investors work 
together. As the process is recurrent for venture capitalists (VCs) but infrequent for 
entrepreneurs, VCs have an asymmetric information advantage over the entrepreneurs since 
they naturally have more knowledge about the investment process and their own 
requirements. This information asymmetry might lead to disadvantages for the entrepreneurs 
in terms of difficulties in receiving funding, unfavorable terms, or negative startup experiences.  
 
In this thesis, the term venture capitalist (VC) refers to an investor that act as intermediary 
between financial institutions and unquoted ventures (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). This is 
often referred to as “formal” venture capital in contrast to “informal” venture capital which 
usually refers to business angels or family and friends. Formal venture capital is a form of 
financing which results in a special form of relationship between the investor and the 
entrepreneur. The fact that a formal VC often has a portfolio of firms means that an investor’s 
risk profile is very different from an entrepreneur’s since the VC’s investments are more 
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diversified (Manigart et al., 2002). In addition, VCs need to allocate their limited resources 
between all their portfolio firms. Hence, actual allocation of resources might be very different 
from those which an entrepreneur requires and expects. There is also a time limit to the 
relationship. VCs need to exit their investments after a certain amount of years to show returns 
to their investors. Although entrepreneurs are aware of the exit goal of the VCs, few 
entrepreneurs have the knowledge to consider all the long term effects from venture capital 
funding.  
Research on venture capital has been dominated by US researchers, based on the 
characteristics of the US venture capital market and entrepreneurial ventures in the US 
(Harrison and Mason, 2019). This thesis focuses on the Swedish venture capital market and 
on Swedish entrepreneurs. Sweden’s venture capital market has evolved through five decades 
to become a mature and developed market, ranked among the top 10 countries in terms of 
venture capital to GDP ratio (Lerner and Tåg, 2013; Isaksson, 2010; OECD, 2018). After 
several Swedish entrepreneurial success stories, such as Skype, Spotify, Klarna, iZettle, and 
King, the regional entrepreneurial ecosystem has grown, and Sweden is today recognized as an 
important and dynamic startup hub (Atomico, 2020; Inc., 2018). Thus, Sweden offers an 
alternative baseline to previous US-focused studies and reflects the European context and 
dynamics of a smaller export-oriented country.  
However, even though Sweden has become a more developed venture capital market and has 
had several successful startups, it is generally considered to be a “thin” venture capital market, 
with a rather small number of both entrepreneurial ventures and capital providers (Isaksson, 
2010). In thin venture capital markets, entrepreneurs have difficulties acquiring capital, while 
investors have difficulties in finding attractive investment opportunities. Therefore, several 
Swedish entrepreneurs have turned to the US venture capital market in search of funding. As 
current research focuses on what drives VC firms to seek investment opportunities abroad (e.g. 
Guler and Guillén, 2010; Moore et al., 2015), less is known about the demand-side and what 
motivates entrepreneurs to search for funding from foreign capital providers. 
 
1.1  Aim of the thesis 
 
As explained above there is a clear need to better understand the “knowledge gap” on the 
demand-side for venture capital. Therefore, the high level aim of the thesis is to provide 
insights on how venture capital can influence startup journeys for Swedish entrepreneurs 
and their companies.  
  
There are many areas of a startup’s journey that might be influenced by funding choices, and 
in this thesis I have chosen three main fields within the venture capital literature to focus on. 
First, I aim to extend the existing literature on information asymmetry in a VC–entrepreneur 
financing situation by discussing how entrepreneurs mitigate the VCs’ asymmetric information 
advantage. Second, I aim to address the current literature on thin venture capital markets and 
cross-border investments by studying what motivate entrepreneurs in thin venture capital 
markets, such as Sweden, to search for funding from thick venture capital markets, such as 
certain regions in the US. Third, I aim to investigate how venture capital funding influence 
startups long-term and in the post-exit phase of the venture capital cycle. 
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The stakeholders that will benefit most from this thesis are entrepreneurs and policy makers. 
Entrepreneurs will know more about the role of venture capital and what is involved when 
raising this type of external capital. The findings are related to the full venture capital cycle, 
from the initial selection phase, through the investment process to after the exit. This provides 
an understanding how venture capital may influence the startup journey both short and long 
term. Policy makers will gain knowledge to use when designing policies to promote regional 
venture capital markets and growth. However, it should be said that this thesis is based on the 
characteristics of the Swedish venture capital market and on Swedish entrepreneurial 
ventures. Consequently, the findings are mostly relevant to markets and settings similar to 
Sweden.  
 
Finally, this thesis acts as a counterweight to popular media and their reporting on venture 
capital. Instead of only reading about success stories and the actual moment of fundraising, 
entrepreneurs can receive a more unbiased view on the full VC–entrepreneur relationship and 
how raising venture capital might influence their startup journey. 
 
 
1.2  Structure of the thesis 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. First, I will present the relevant theoretical 
framework as well as the Swedish context for this thesis. Next, I will discuss the methodology 
used in the appended papers and the writing process of the research work. The appended 
papers will then be summarized, and the main contributions will be presented. Finally, I will 
conclude with the theoretical contributions and practical implications together with future 
research suggestions.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter I introduce the main theoretical framework that I have utilized and built this 
thesis on. I present the most relevant theories and literature from my thesis’s point of view and 
discuss what elements they emphasize and disregard. The theoretical framework is intended 
to support the discussion and capture the different research streams in focus for this thesis. I 
will start by discussing the theories and literature that lead up to my research questions: 
information asymmetry; cross-border investments and “thin” markets; and the venture capital 
cycle. Then, I will give a brief overview of the literature on the entrepreneurial perspective on 
venture capital funding.  
 
 
2.1 Information asymmetry 
 
In a VC–entrepreneurial financing situation, information is often shared unequally among the 
parties and the problem of information asymmetry is generally cited as the main explanation 
of the financial constraints faced by small firms (MacIntosh, 1994; Sahlman, 1990). Among the 
issues that arise from information asymmetries are agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). These problems arise because of “hidden information” and “hidden actions” between 
the parties (Amit et al. 1998). Hidden information refers to a situation in which one party 
possesses relevant information that is not known by the other party, for example, 
entrepreneurs have more information about their driving forces and their venture than 
investors. A situation with high information asymmetry in the form of hidden information 
creates the risk of “adverse selection” where the VC will have difficulties distinguishing 
between good and bad ventures to invest in. Hidden actions tend to give rise to “moral hazard,” 
which occurs when one party cannot observe relevant actions taken by the other party, for 
example, once the entrepreneurs have raised capital, they might spend it on items that are not 
in accordance with the VC’s interest.  
 
However, the problem of information asymmetry is two-sided in the sense that nascent 
entrepreneurs are unfamiliar with the VC’s financing process and requirements (Carpentier 
and Suret, 2006). Difficulties in distinguishing between good and bad VCs due to lack of 
experience and knowledge is an adverse selection problem for the entrepreneur. Furthermore, 
a VC often provides substantial managerial contributions to the venture (e.g. Gorman and 
Sahlman, 1989; Gompers and Lerner, 2004). However, these “efforts” provided by the VC are 
not something that can be legally verified, creating a potential moral hazard problem for the 
entrepreneur in which the VC might provide insufficient effort (De Bettignies and Brander, 
2007). Several researchers have started to argue that the agency perspective in entrepreneurial 
finance literature describes the VC–entrepreneur relationship in a one-sided direction. These 
scholars argue that most research on moral hazard is focused on the VC’s control over the 
entrepreneur’s opportunistic behavior while ignoring the entrepreneur’s concern that the VC 
may act opportunistically (Christensen et al. 2009; Drover et al. 2014; Shepherd and 
Zacharakis, 2001).  
 
Although scholars have acknowledged that problems arising from asymmetric information are 
two-sided, most studies on information asymmetry in a VC-entrepreneur relationship have 
focused on how VCs mitigate their agency problems (Drover et al. 2017). To overcome adverse 
selection problems, investors use mechanisms such as screening, due diligence, syndication of 
deals, and specialization (e.g., Cumming, 2006; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 
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2004). To overcome moral hazard issues, VCs use mechanisms such as staging of investments, 
legal contracting, and extensive monitoring (e.g., Arcot, 2014; Burchardt et al. 2016; Pruthi, 
Wright, and Lockett, 2003). Entrepreneurs use mechanisms as “signaling” to reduce 
uncertainty and information asymmetries which concern VCs. In order to convince capital 
providers about the qualities of the venture, entrepreneurs need to send positive signals about 
themselves and about their venture (Connelly et al. , 2011; Bollazzi, et al., 2019).  
 
However, all the mechanisms above are used to reduce the information asymmetry risks from 
the VC’s perspective. The goal of these mechanisms is to make it easier for VC’s to distinguish 
between good and bad ventures (adverse selection) or to decrease the risk of opportunistic 
behavior from the entrepreneur (moral hazard). To the best of my knowledge, no study has so 
far examined how entrepreneurs mitigate their information asymmetry problems. How do 
entrepreneurs distinguish between different funding alternatives and investors (adverse 
selection) or how do entrepreneurs handle their concern that the VC may act opportunistically 
(moral hazard)? This leads to the research question in paper ONE:  
 




2.2 Cross-border investments and “thin” venture capital markets  
 
Due to the need to reduce information asymmetries and related adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems, venture capital investing has long been a local phenomenon (Wright and 
Robbie, 1998; Cumming and Dai, 2010). The geographical proximity to investment targets was 
regarded as necessary to locate and evaluate target companies (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) 
and to efficiently provide monitoring and value adding services (Mäkelä and Maula, 2006). 
However, recent research has identified a shift toward a more globally distributed venture 
capital investment pattern where VCs have shown an increasing interest in crossing border to 
gain access to investment opportunities (Aizenman and Kendall 2012; Guler and Guillén 2010; 
Wright et al. 2005).  
 
The supply of possible capital providers and entrepreneurial ventures varies between countries 
and regions. These various levels are often referred to as “thin” or “thick” venture capital 
markets (e.g. Nightingale et al., 2009; Bertoni et al., 2016). Thin venture capital markets are 
characterized by a small number of entrepreneurial ventures and a small number of capital 
providers. As a result, entrepreneurs in thin markets have difficulties acquiring capital, while 
investors have difficulties in finding attractive investment opportunities. In contrast, thick 
markets are characterized by a large number of both capital providers and entrepreneurial 
ventures. The Swedish venture capital market is by many considered as a rather thin market 
(Isaksson, 2010), whereas the US venture capital market is considered as a thick market, at 
least in certain regions such as the Silicon Valley and the New York-Boston-Washington 
Corridor. Consequently, several Swedish entrepreneurs have turned to the US venture capital 
market in search of funding for their new ventures.  
 
The majority of research on cross-border venture capital focuses on the VC’s investment 
decisions and the characteristics of VCs that invest abroad (e.g. Guler and Guillén 2010; 
Manigart et al. 2000; Moore et al., 2015). To some extent, the investor is often viewed by this 
literature as the leading party in the investment process, while the entrepreneur is often 
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perceived as a passive target. This is problematic since policy makers trying to stimulate 
regional venture capital markets also need to be aware of the mechanisms that drive 
entrepreneurs from one market to another. To fill this gap, the purpose of paper TWO is to 
explore what motivates entrepreneurs in thin venture capital markets to search for funding 
from distant and thick venture capital markets. Since the US is the most important foreign VC 
provider for Swedish entrepreneurs (Tillväxtanalys, 2020), we investigate the reasons why 
Swedish entrepreneurs choose VC funding from US investors, particularly from regions that 
are known to be thick venture capital markets. Hence the research question for paper TWO is: 
 
RQ2: Why do Swedish entrepreneurs raise venture capital in the US? 
 
2.3 The venture capital cycle 
 
Entrepreneurs aiming to raise venture capital will have to consider the different phases of the 
VC’s investment cycle and the impact of these phases on their relationship with the investor. 
Overall, three phases can be distinguished in the venture capital investment cycle: the pre-
investment, post-investment and exit phases (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  
 
The VC’s goal in the pre-investment phase is to make an investment in a venture that offers the 
potential for significant capital gains. Thus, to qualify, a venture must have a realistic chance 
of achieving significant growth and offer an exit opportunity in three to seven years after the 
investment (Sahlman, 1990). For the entrepreneur, it is crucial to understand what VCs are 
looking for when making investment decisions and the VC’s decision-making process has 
attracted a lot of scholarly interest (e.g. Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Shepherd, 1999).  
In the post-investment phase, the VCs are essentially engaged in two broad types of activities; 
monitoring and providing value-added activities. Monitoring activities reduce the agency risks 
associated with VC-entrepreneur relationships (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994). Value-added 
activities relate to the VCs attempts to increase the upside potential of the investment by 
adding value beyond cash (De Clercq and Manigart, 2007).  
 
The final phase of the venture capital process is the exit from the ventures in which they have 
invested. Exiting is the crucial last step in the venture capital cycle, because without an exit 
there are no returns for the VC and its investors. Exits can occur in a number of ways. A 
company can list on a public market (IPO), be acquired by another company (trade sale), buy 
back the investors’ shares, or be shut down. While IPOs usually are the most preferred exit 
option for both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, trade sales are by far the most common 
exit vehicle (Cumming & McIntosh, 2003; Invest Europe, 2018). Research on the venture 
capital cycle has mainly taken a financier’s perspective and has therefor often ended at the exit 
phase. Thus, little is known about the post-exit developments of venture capital funded 
startups and how the type of exit affects a venture’s long term growth. This is the basis for the 
research question in paper THREE: 
 
RQ3: How does venture capital funding influence startups long-term? 
 
As stated above, Tyebjee & Bruno (1984), distinguished three phases in the venture capital 
investment cycle: the pre-investment, post-investment and exit phases. However, I believe that 
the influence of venture capital funding for entrepreneurs and their startup does not end at the 
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exit phase but continues post exit. Thus, I have amended the model from Tyebjee & Bruno 
(1984) with a fourth phase named the “post-exit phase”, which is shown in figure 1. I believe 
that this theoretical model better illustrates the phases of the venture capital cycle from the 








Figure 1. The venture capital cycle from the entrepreneurs’ perspective (amended from 
Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  
 
 
2.4 The entrepreneurial perspective 
 
Although there is a vast literature about how VCs screen and select the entrepreneurial firms 
they wish to invest in (e.g., Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Hsu et al., 2014; Sahlman, 1990), only a 
handful of studies have looked at venture capital investments from an entrepreneur’s 
perspective (De Bettignies and Brander, 2007: De Clercq et al., 2006; Drover et al. 2014; 
Fairchild, 2011; Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012; Hsu, 2004; Valliere and Peterson, 2007; 
Zacharakis et al. 2010).  
 
De Bettignies and Brander (2007) examined the entrepreneur's choice between bank finance 
and venture capital and found that there is a two-sided moral hazard problem when choosing 
venture capital as both the entrepreneur and VC provide unverifiable effort. Fairchild (2011) 
analyzed the entrepreneur's choice between VC and angel financing and found that an 
entrepreneur may consider both economic and behavioral factors when making choice of 
financier. De Clercq et al. (2006) discussed how entrepreneurs should find the right investors, 
secure the right amount of money, and obtain a deal structured in an equitable manner. The 
study also suggested that foundations for a good match between VC and entrepreneur relate to 
complementary skills and the potential for the entrepreneur and VC to have an open, trusting 
relationship. Although these studies acknowledge the active part of the entrepreneur in the 
VC–entrepreneur relationship, they have no empirical findings from entrepreneurs but base 
their findings indirectly on research of VCs. 
 
Studies with empirical findings from entrepreneurs largely focus on the evaluation of potential 
VCs. Valliere and Peterson (2007) found that both novice and experienced entrepreneurs 
considered valuation to be the primary criterion, and also viewed the terms and conditions of 
the investment deal as important. Furthermore, the study suggested that entrepreneurs were 
not particularly looking for “smart money,” that is, investors capable of providing a range of 
additional services to help the portfolio firm. Hsu (2004) suggested that entrepreneurs are 
willing to forego offers with higher valuations to partner with more reputable VCs. Hallen and 
Eisenhardt (2012) found that firms that form investment ties efficiently avoid drawn-out and 
high-effort searches, failed attempts, and undesirable partners. Drover et al. (2014) found that 
ethical reputation of a VC profoundly influences the entrepreneur's willingness to partner. 
Zacharakis et al. (2010) suggested that it is important for the entrepreneurial team to build 







Exit phase Post-exit phase 
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arise. Although these studies mainly focus on the initial phase of the venture capital cycle, the 
studies are insightful because they suggest that the entrepreneur plays an active part in the 
relationship and that there are interesting insights from entrepreneurs with prior venture 





3. THE SWEDISH CONTEXT  
The findings in this thesis are mainly based on data and the characteristics of the Swedish 
venture capital market and Swedish entrepreneurial ventures. In this chapter I first discuss the 
Swedish venture capital industry and then present data regarding entrepreneurship in Sweden.  
 
3.1 The Swedish venture capital industry 
The Swedish venture capital industry has its roots in the 1970s when the first formal venture 
capital firms were established. Despite the financial crises in the beginning of the 1990s and in 
2001, the two decades around the millennium succeeded in establishing a healthy venture 
capital market in Sweden (Isaksson, 2010). An important aspect of the development of a 
venture capital market in Sweden is the crucial role played by the government. Increased 
financial market liberalization and active government policies toward the venture capital 
market have helped the Swedish venture capital market to take off (Lerner and Tåg, 2013). 
Figure 2 displays venture capital investments in 2017 as a share of GDP, revealing that Sweden 
is in seventh place with investments corresponding to 0.06% of GDP. US and Israel are in the 
top with investments corresponding to 0.40% and 0.38% respectively (OECD, 2018). While 
the gap is still large in a worldwide comparison, Sweden is among the top European countries.  
 
Figure 2. Venture capital investments 2017 as a percentage of GDP (OECD, 2018) 
In 2018, formal venture capital investments in Swedish portfolio firms amounted to SEK 3.32 
billion, an increase of SEK 998 million (+43 percent) compared with the previous year 
(Tillväxtanalys, 2020). The increase was mainly attributable to increased investments from 
foreign funds and Swedish private funds. Foreign venture capital investments in Swedish 
portfolio firms amounted to 50 percent of total venture capital investments in 2018 
(Tillväxtanalys, 2020). The Swedish government is still the main investor in portfolio 
companies in the earliest seed phase, while foreign and Swedish private funds invest to a higher 
degree in the later phases. Industrifonden, Almi Invest and Saminvest are the three Swedish 
governmental funds. The Swedish AP funds (pension funds) also invest in early stage non-











































































fundraising deal in Eur0pe with a round size $1000M1. The Swedish company Klarna had the 
eight largest deal with a round size of $460M2 (Atomico, 2020). Both these deals included 
several types of venture capital investors, i.e. not only formal venture capital. 
 
Table 1 displays the top Swedish venture capital firms based on number of deals made in 
Swedish companies in 2019, including Q1 2020 (Nordic9, 2020). It should be noted that these 
data were collected before any possible effects of COVID-19 on investment rounds. Thus, the 
table might look quite different for 2020. Note that Almi Invest has been excluded from this 
list. As can be seen from the table, Schibsted Growth is the Swedish VC which had the largest 
number of investment deals in Swedish portfolio firms in 2019. However, Creandum had by 
far the largest average round investment in MUSD.  
 







Schibsted Growth 14 4.33 Bynk, Capcito, Dicopay, Hypoteket 
Bolån, Pej 








9 6.34 G:Loot, Meds, Billogram, Albacross,  
Oden Technologies 
Industrifonden 8 7.52 Funnel, Gesynta Pharma, Fishbrain, 
Combinostic, Crosser 
Inbox Capital  7 7.33 Voi, Kitab Sawti, Meds, Bilogram, Zaver 
Norrsken 
Foundation 
7 4.16 Einride, Matsmart, Kognity,  
Winningtemp, Heart Aerospace  
Bonnier Ventures  6 6.31 Sulapac, Doktor.se, Kitab Sawti 
Brightly Ventures  6 2.42 Kaching, Worldfavor, PerceptiLabs 
Wellstreet  6 1.57 Tibber, Textual 
Philian Invest  6 5.93 Kognity, Fyndiq 
Table 1. Top Swedish venture capital firms based on number of deals made in 
Swedish companies in 2019, including Q1 2020 (Nordic9, 2020).   
Of the total venture capital investments in Sweden 2018, 94 percent were placed in firms in 
the metropolitan municipalities, whereas 5 percent in urban municipalities and 1 percent in 
rural municipalities (Tillväxtanalys, 2020). Thus, there is a clear concentration of venture 




1 The largest investors in this round were Volkswagen Group (DE), BMW Group (DE), AMF (SE), 
Folksam Group (SE) and IMAS Foundation/IKEA (SE). 
2 The largest investors in this round were Dragoneer Investment Group (US), Svenska Första AP-fonden 
(SE), Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Merian Chrysalis Investment Company (UK) and funds 
managed by Blackrock Investment (US). 
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3.2 Entrepreneurship in Sweden 
 
In 2019 Sweden had approximately 1,200,000 registered companies. The majority of these 
companies (96 percent), were small firms with less than 10 employees. Small and medium size 
businesses (0-249 employees) amounted to 99.9 percent of all companies (Tillväxtverket, 
2020). However, although larger companies only accounted for a small fraction of all 
companies, they contributed with 40 percent of the total turnover in the economy and one 
third of all employees (Tillväxtverket, 2020). The number of newly started companies in 
Sweden amounted to 67,000 in 2018 (Tillväxtanalys, 2019)3.  
 
In comparison with other European countries, the level of early-stage entrepreneurial activity 
in Sweden is relatively low (GEM, 2020). This could partly be explained by the tradition of 
large enterprises within the Swedish economy where a lot of the entrepreneurial skills have 
been distributed among established firms (GEM, 2020). However, even if Sweden ranks low 
on early-stage entrepreneurial activity per capita, the country has over the last years produced 
several international well-known companies such as Skype, Spotify, Klarna, iZettle and King, 
which has made the popular media sometimes referring to Sweden as a ‘global startup hub’ 
and a ‘unicorn factory’ (EU-Startups, 2019; Inc., 2018; Wharton, 2015).  
 
An article published by Wharton School (2015), claims that after Silicon Valley, Stockholm 
produces the highest number of so-called “unicorns” per capita. This implies that the Swedish 
entrepreneurial ecosystem has comparably many startups that grow into larger companies. 
This can also be seen in data on venture capital investments in Swedish startups in 2019, where 
ten startups accounted for more than half of the total venture capital raised in Swedish startups 
(Dagens Industri, 2019). Table 2 displays the ten largest VC investments per company in 
Sweden in 2019. As previously stated, Klarna and Northvolt had by far the largest investment 
rounds in 2019. It should be noted that Table 2 includes all types of venture capital (e.g. 
corporate VC, governmental VC, foreign VC). 
 
Company Industry Founding year VC raised in 2019 
(MUSD) 
Klarna Fintech 2005 567 
Northvolt4 Energy 2015 515 
Voi Scooters 2018 113 
Bynk Fintech 2016 52 
CTEK Energy 2011 52 
Tink Fintech 2012 46 
Einride Transportation 2016 25 
Yubico Hardware security 2007 25 
G-Loot E-sport 2014 24 
Mathem Online shoping 2009 21 
 
Table 2. Venture capital investment in Swedish tech startups in 2019, as of 8th 
November 2019, (Dagens Industri, 2019) 
 
3 These numbers include both limited liability companies as well as sole proprietorships. 
4 As per the 8th of November 2019, only 515 MUSD of the total investment of 1,000 MUSD in 
Northvolt had been registered at Bolagsverket. 
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The Swedish startup economy could be classified as a strongly export-oriented economy. More 
than four out of ten entrepreneurs have customers outside Sweden and more than one in four 
entrepreneurs starting or running a new business expect sales outside Sweden to generate 25% 
or more of their revenue (GEM, 2020).  
According to the GEM report (2020) the main motivation for Swedish entrepreneurs to start 
their own business is ‘To build great wealth’ (55% agree) and ‘To make a difference’ (50% 
agree). Compared to most other countries relatively few Swedish entrepreneurs answered that 
they wanted to start a company ‘To earn a living’ (39% agree). 33% of the entrepreneurs agreed 





In the following chapter I present the methodology used in the appended papers and the 
writing process of the research work. As each of the appended papers describes the specific 
research method used, this chapter expands the overall approach to the research methodology 
for this thesis. 
  
4.1 Writing process and timeline of the research process 
 
I started my doctoral studies in March 2018 and I have since then written three papers which 
form this licentiate thesis. In figure 3 I have illustrated the development process and timeline 
of the papers in this thesis. In addition, I have included some other relevant milestones. 
Because of the COVID-19 virus the BCERC conference 2020 was cancelled and the planned 
presentation of paper TWO could not be carried out. Further details on conferences and review 


















Figure 3. Development process of the papers and some other relevant milestones.  
 
 
4.2 Research design 
 
Entrepreneurial finance encompasses the intersection of the two separate fields of 
“entrepreneurship” and “finance.” For high ranking journals in the field of entrepreneurial 
finance (e.g. Small Business Economics, Venture Capital) the majority of studies are and have 
historically been based on quantitative research methods.  
 
Since I wanted to use interview studies with a qualitative inductive approach for paper ONE 
and TWO, I searched for a methodology that could convince quantitatively inclined readers 
that the conclusions from a qualitative study are plausible and defensible. By studying the few 
examples of qualitative methods within the entrepreneurial finance field, I found the “Gioia 
methodology” (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Although a qualitative method, I believe that 
this approach allows the reader, whether qualitatively or quantitatively inclined, to more easily 
discern the progression from raw data to emergent theory.  
 
In paper THREE the aim was to study what happens after exit for venture capital funded 
startups in Sweden. We wanted to track the startups from one year before exit and for as long 
2018 2019 2020 





Data collection P1 
P3 presented (ENTFIN) 
P1 presented (RENT) 
P3 R&R process (ERD)- rejected 
W
riting P2 
P1 in review process (ETP) - rejected 
P2 cancelled presentation (BCERC) 
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as the firms were traceable. The purpose was to show patterns and trends for a nation-wide 
sample of venture capital funded startups. For this study we chose a quantitative method where 
we compiled a longitudinal data set based on information from annual reports.  
 
Table 3 lists the research design and data collection for each paper. Thereafter, follows a 
discussion on the research methodology in general. 
 
 Research design Data collection 
Paper ONE Gioia methodology 20 semi-structured interviews 
Paper TWO Gioia methodology 33 semi-structured interviews plus a 
questionnaire with 106 responses 
Paper THREE Quantitative study with a 
longitudinal data set 
Nationwide sample of 273 startups that made 
IPO or M&A exit 2002-2017 
Table 3. Research design and data collection per paper 
 
 
4.2.1 Qualitative method (paper ONE and TWO) 
 
With the Gioia methodology the interviewers get close to the interviewees and conscientiously 
try to use the terms of the interviewees to understand their experiences (Gioia, Corley, & 
Hamilton, 2013). Once completed, the interviews are transcribed and analyzed (using the 
Nvivo software in my case). The coding begins inductively, using first-order codes based on 
concepts and themes expressed directly in the statements of the interviewees. Codes and 
themes are reviewed and adjusted until agreement among researchers are achieved. The full 
set of 1st-order themes, 2nd-order themes and aggregate dimensions then gives a basis for 
building a data structure (see Figure 4). This data structure not only helps to translate the data 
into a sensible visual aid, it also provides a graphic representation of the progression from raw 
data to terms and themes in conducting the analyses.  
 
 















Figure 4. Example of data structure with the Gioia methodology 
 
 
To obtain interviewees for article ONE and TWO, purposeful sampling was used to select 
entrepreneurs who were experienced with our research phenomena but had various 
backgrounds and whose ventures were in different industries and stages. In this sampling 
procedure, the selection criterion is based around a specific variable of interest, often for 
• Higher level of technical expertise among US VCs 
• More investors with entrepreneurial background and 
experience from the industry  








Smarter money • More VC firms that have a specific niche 
• Better network to find and obtain expertise advice 
• More experienced and professional VCs 




comparison purposes. The founders were found through internet searches, personal networks, 
and snowball sampling of participant entrepreneurs. 
 
A semi-structured format was used for the interviews, starting with a standard list of open 
questions which allows the interviewee to divert and new ideas to be brought up during the 
interview. Combining semi-structured interviews with elements of narrative interviews 
provides the interviewee opportunities to present their experiences in detail. The central 
element of this form of interview is that the interviewer recurrently asks the interviewee to 
present narratives of situations (e.g. “If you look back, what was you first….? Could you recount 
that situation for me?”).  
 
For article TWO the interviews were performed as part of a Master Thesis for six students in 
the program Industrial Engineering and Management at Chalmers University of Technology. 
The interview guide was developed together with their supervisor (and the co-author of the 
paper) Anders Isaksson, with me as a sounding board. Several meetings were held during the 
data collection process to ensure validity and reliability. Each interview was performed by at 
least two students and was recorded and transcribed. The analysis of the interviews was 
performed by us and based on the transcribed interviews and within the agreed respondent 
confidentiality. The students have approved our use of the collected data, and they have 




4.2.2 Quantitative method (paper THREE) 
 
For paper THREE, we downloaded the public annual reports for the relevant period for the 
273 startups to compile a longitudinal data set of their development until exit and post-exit for 
as long as possible. When the information in the annual reports had gaps or was hard to 
interpret, we assembled complementary information from company websites and newspaper 
articles. We also collected additional data from the Swedish Tax Agency and Swedish 
Companies Registration Office to substantiate our records.  
 
Based on this data we conducted a variety of multivariate analyses but because of endogeneity 
problems (e.g. determinants of a particular exit route influence not only the exit route but most 
likely also the post-exit performance) we chose to focus on descriptive statistics rather than 
causality and explanatory variables. Consequently, the focus in paper THREE is on nationwide 
descriptive statistics on pre- and post-exit performance for venture capital funded startups.  
 
 
4.3 Validity and Reliability 
 
In paper ONE several steps were taken to enhance the reliability of the study’s findings. First, 
interviews were reviewed and transcribed within 24 hours of the original interviews. In 
addition a self-reflective journal was kept with learnings from both the interviewee and the 
interview process. Second, codes and themes were reviewed and adjusted together with my 
supervisor until agreement was achieved. Third, checks were conducted with five of the 
interview participants to ensure that the story matched their experiences. To ensure the 
validity in paper ONE two additional interviews were carried out with VCs who previously had 
founded their own venture capital-backed startups. Additionally, current and archival 
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secondary data for each founder regarding their venture capital funding were collected, 
including website materials, annual reports, and newspaper clippings. These documents added 
details to the background story and allowed comparisons with the interview data. 
 
In paper TWO the data collection was performed as part of a Master Thesis, as mentioned 
above. To enhance reliability, interviews were done in pairs and both transcription and main 
findings were discussed among all members of the groups. Based on the transcribed 
interviews, I performed my own coding before reading the findings of the students. Emergent 
themes were then compared and found to be very similar. To gain additional perspective and 
to triangulate data the students conducted 15 additional interviews with entrepreneurs who 
had raised venture capital from Swedish investors. After the interviews and coding, the 
students performed a survey with entrepreneurs to support and rank their findings (106 
responses). 
 
When using interviews for inductive research, as in paper ONE and TWO, the size of sample is 
determined by the “theoretical saturation” of categories rather than by the need for 
demographic “representativeness”. The people who are interviewed in qualitative research are 
not meant to be representative of a population. Instead, the goal is to generalize to theory 
rather than to populations (Bryman and Bell, 2011). In other words, it is the quality of the 
theoretical conclusions that are made out of qualitative data that is crucial to the assessment 
of generalization.  
 
In paper THREE various methods were utilised to ensure validity. The sample represents our 
best effort in achieving a complete picture of venture capital financed startups which made an 
IPO or were acquired during the selected time period. The original source for our sample is 
Dow Jones’ database VentureSource. It is possible that VentureSource missed certain venture 
capital funded startups in Sweden. However, since we only included startups that exited 
through IPOs or acquisition, which are considered as the most successful exit routes and 
arguably of most interest to VentureSource and their customers, this part of VentureSource’s 
database should be the most complete part. Furthermore, since Swedish annual reports are 
quite detailed even for smaller companies we managed to gather very detailed data for the 
studied companies. However, in terms of replicability this study might have practical 
limitations as access to annual reports is usually more restricted in other countries than 
Sweden.  
 
Finally, when discussing methodology I believe that it is relevant to discuss my role as a 
researcher. Having worked in various finance roles for over a decade, as well as being part of a 
startup and searching for funding myself, has given me considerable experience from the 
finance industry and the research topic. I believe that this has been vital in establishing trust 
and obtaining authenticity in the interviews as well as being able to analyze the data in the 
studies. The practical experience has provided me with sound background knowledge that have 
been valuable in the preparation of my research, as well as in the execution of it.  
 
However, being an insider is not solely positive but there are particular risks of biases and of 
being unable to see certain patterns which are more easily depicted from outside. Therefore, I 
frequently discuss with my supervisor and fellow PhD colleagues to help analyze the data. In 
this manner new patterns might be identified that will help in improving both the construct 
validity and the internal validity of the paper.   
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5. SUMMARY AND MAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE PAPERS 
 
In this chapter I make a summary and present the main contributions of the appended papers.  
 
 
5.1 Paper ONE: Entrepreneurial experiences from venture capital funding: 
Exploring two-sided information asymmetry  
 
Information between entrepreneurs and VCs is often shared unequally. VCs are experienced 
and professional dealmakers, while entrepreneurs have great knowledge about their venture 
but usually limited knowledge about the VC’s financing process and requirements. For 
entrepreneurs, the VCs’ asymmetric information advantage can lead to disadvantages in terms 
of difficulties in receiving funding, unfavorable terms, or negative startup experiences.  
 
This paper studies how entrepreneurs mitigate problems from information asymmetry in a 
VC–entrepreneur relationship based on in-depth interviews with 20 Swedish entrepreneurs. 
The study answers calls for research on what entrepreneurs can do to create a good partnership 
with VCs and how information asymmetries could be used to study double-sided agency 
problems in a VC–entrepreneur relationship. 
 
Four themes emerged from these interviews: (1) choosing the optimal time to raise the initial 
external capital, (2) ensuring that the VC fits the startup, (3) studying and understanding the 
VC process beforehand, and (4) building an open and honest relationship with the VC. 
Although entrepreneurs have not developed any formal tools similar to what VCs have done to 
mitigate information asymmetry risks, our study shows that entrepreneurs use informal tools 
based on experiences from themselves and others. This indicates that the entrepreneur might 
be considered as a more active part in the VC-entrepreneur relationship than most previous 
studies have assumed. 
 
The paper underlines how a two-sided agency perspective on a VC–entrepreneur relationship 
helps identifying mechanisms that mitigate information asymmetry problems for the 
entrepreneurs. In addition, it extends the existing literature on two-sided information 
asymmetry in a VC–entrepreneur financing situation by discussing the mechanisms that 
entrepreneurs use to mitigate the VCs’ asymmetric information advantage. The study also 
makes important practical contribution to entrepreneurs and practitioners aiming to support 
nascent entrepreneurs by gathering valuable advice on issues concerning venture capital 
funding. 
 
This paper has been presented at the Research in Entrepreneurship and Small Business 
(RENT) conference in Berlin in 2019. It has been in the review process of Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, but eventually got rejected. The paper is currently in the review process 









5.2 Paper TWO: Cross-border investments: Why Swedish entrepreneurs raise 
venture capital in the US 
 
Venture capital has traditionally been portrayed as a local phenomenon, where investors and 
entrepreneurs keep a close proximity to each other in order to reduce transaction costs and 
information asymmetries. However, a new, growing body of literature suggests a shift toward 
a more globally distributed venture capital investment pattern.  
 
This paper investigates the reasons to why Swedish entrepreneurs seek venture capital funding 
in the US. While prior entrepreneurial research on cross-border investments has focused on 
global venture capital investments from the investors’ perspective, research has not explored 
distal venture capital funding from the entrepreneur’s perspective. This is problematic as 
policy makers trying to stimulate regional venture capital markets need to be aware of the 
mechanisms that drive entrepreneurs from one market to another. To address this gap, we 
explore what motivates entrepreneurs to search for funding from geographically distant 
regions. Since the US is the most important foreign venture capital provider to Swedish 
entrepreneurs, the purpose of this study is to investigate the reasons why Swedish 
entrepreneurs choose venture capital funding from US investors. 
 
Based on 18 interviews with Swedish entrepreneurs who have either received US venture 
capital or who were actively looking for US investors, four themes emerged: (1) the US venture 
capital market has access to more capital and has higher valuations; (2) US investors are 
considered to contribute with more non-financial help; (3) US venture capital is considered as 
a mean to position the company for market expansion and future financing rounds; (4) US 
venture capital gives validation to the companies and their founders. To gain additional 
perspective and to triangulate data, 15 additional interviews were carried out with Swedish 
entrepreneurs who had raised venture capital from Swedish investors. We then supplemented 
this data with a survey to support the findings from our qualitative data analysis. 
 
The paper shows that the large supply of capital and investors on the US market seem to play 
an important role for Swedish entrepreneurs. This confirms earlier research on thin markets 
and extends this literature by using the perspective of the entrepreneur. The study also 
contributes to the literature on cross-border investments by showing how Swedish 
entrepreneurs use US venture capital as a mean to improve the company's market position and 
conditions for future development. Finally, although research has focused on reasons and 
processes that push the investors to seek investment opportunities abroad, the study suggests 
that the trend towards a more internationalized venture capital market can also be explained 
by the push from entrepreneurs who actively search for venture capital in distant regions.  
 
This paper was accepted to be presented at the Babson College Entrepreneurship Research 
Conference (BCERC) conference in Knoxville, Tennessee in 2020. However, because of  
COVID-19, this conference was cancelled. The paper is currently in the review process of 







5.3 Paper THREE: Growth of Swedish venture capital financed startups after IPO 
or acquisition  
 
Venture capitalists may accelerate startups during their involvement until the financial exit 
event when they sell their equity stake, but how startups perform long-term and post-exit is 
less known. To the extent post-exit growth of startups has been studied, indications are that 
different exit routes, such as going public or being acquired, lead to divergent post-exit growth 
trajectories for the startups. The long-term impact of startups is to a large extent dependent 
on the subsequent performance of the startups following their exit events. Hence, if startups 
remain in their regions of origin and grow post-exit constitute important policy concerns. 
 
The paper investigates if and how exit routes of venture capital financed startups matter from 
a regional development perspective, i.e. to what extent venture capital backed firms stay and 
grow in the region. The study is mainly a descriptive study showing how venture capital funded 
startups perform pre- and post-exit related to exit route. 
 
The sample consists of 273 venture capital funded startups founded in Sweden 1992-2010 and 
exited by Initial Public Offering (IPO) and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in 2002-2017. By 
using annual reports and other available public data we tracked the venture capital funded 
startups from exit and for as long as the data allows. 
 
The paper presents a previously unseen post-exit pattern specific for venture capital funded 
startups. 32 percent of the studied companies exited via IPO, of which 3 percent exited on 
regulated stock exchanges and 28 percent on Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs). 43 
percent of the studied companies exited through foreign M&As, and 25 percent through 
domestic M&As. We find that the pre-exit performance of the startups relates to exit route, and 
that exit routes lead to divergent post-exit growth trajectories. Firms exiting through IPOs 
(regulated or MTF) have stronger post-exit growth than firms having either a foreign or 
domestic acquirer. Furthermore, approximately half of the acquired firms are closed down 
post-exit. The main theoretical contribution is that we need to revise our understanding of 
acquisition being the only viable exit route apart from a few exceptional IPOs and increase our 
understanding of when and how an IPO alternative should be preferred. The largest 
performance improvement post-exit is among the startups exited by IPO on MTF, making 
MTFs relevant to consider for future studies. 
 
This paper has been presented at the Entrepreneurial Finance (ENTFIN) conference in Trier 
in 2019. It has been in a revise and resubmit process of Entrepreneurship & Regional 














5.4 Positioning of the papers  
 
In figure 5 I have plotted the papers in this thesis next to the venture capital cycle described in 
























Figure 5. The thesis’ papers plotted next to the venture capital cycle from the entrepreneurs’ 
perspective (amended from Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  
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6. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Going back to the original aim of the thesis: to provide insights on how venture capital can 
influence startup journeys for Swedish entrepreneurs and their companies. Below I present 
the theoretical contributions and some future research suggestions. Finally, I conclude by 
discussing the practical implications of the thesis.  
 
6.1 Theoretical contributions and suggestions for future research  
Regarding the theoretical contribution of the thesis, key discoveries relate to the demand-side 
perspective of two-sided information asymmetry in the VC-entrepreneur relationship, cross-
border investments and thin markets, and the long-term effects of venture capital. Below I will 
discuss these contributions and provide suggestions for further research.  
One interesting aspect from a theoretical point of view on the entrepreneur-VC relationship is 
the two-sided information asymmetry between the parties. Numerous researchers have 
studied the mechanisms that VCs have developed to mitigate their information asymmetry 
problems. Several scholars have also acknowledged that problems arising from asymmetric 
information are two-sided. However, research has not managed to empirically identify how 
these problems are managed by the entrepreneurs. Although entrepreneurs have not 
developed any formal tools similar to what VCs have done to mitigate information asymmetry 
risks, paper ONE shows that entrepreneurs use informal tools based on experiences from 
themselves and others. This indicates that the entrepreneur might be considered as a more 
active part in the VC-entrepreneur relationship than most previous studies have assumed. 
Even though information asymmetry has been used before to explain the relationship between 
VC and entrepreneur (e.g., Amit el al. 1998; Carpentier and Suret, 2006; De Bettignies and 
Brander, 2007), this study shows how actions taken by entrepreneurs might be explained by 
the motive to mitigate their information asymmetry problems. By challenging the traditional 
agency theory approach in a VC–entrepreneur relationship, where it is generally assumed that 
VCs act as principals and entrepreneurs act as agents, this study shows how a two-sided agency 
perspective helps to discern entrepreneurs’ information asymmetry problems and the tools 
used to handle these problems. In addition to our analysis there are a lot of interesting future 
research avenues. Key questions that could be studied are: What is considered to be a “good” 
or “bad” investor from the entrepreneur’s perspective, how is the decisions process when 
entrepreneurs choose between various types of venture capital and how do positive or negative 
prior venture capital experience influence future funding? I have touched upon these aspects 
in paper ONE but rigorous empirical analysis is highly recommended, as is replication studies 
with entrepreneurs in other countries. 
One interesting and potentially relevant theoretical contribution is the entrepreneurial 
perspective on the trend on cross-border investments. Although research has focused on 
reasons and processes that push the investors to seek investment opportunities abroad (e.g. 
Guler and Guillén 2010; Manigart et al. 2000; Moore et al., 2015), paper TWO suggests that 
the trend towards a more internationalized venture capital market can also be explained by the 
push from entrepreneurs who actively search for venture capital in distant regions. In a small 
and thin venture capital market as Sweden, it is not only the small amount of capital providers 
that may push the entrepreneurs to search for funding abroad, but also the fact that foreign 
VCs may provide opportunities and benefits that domestic VCs have difficulties in providing, 
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such as more technical expertise or different attitude towards risk. Instead of stagnating in a 
thin market, new entrepreneurs might recognize the opportunities that a thick market can 
provide. In paper TWO we show that Swedish entrepreneurs consider US VC as a means to 
improve company market positioning and conditions for future development. The view that 
emerged was that VCs in thick markets can facilitate establishing a position in their home 
market as well as enhancing the company’s position for future financing rounds. Positioning 
is rarely discussed in the VC literature when considering the entrepreneurial perspective on 
VC. We believe that our study thus alters positioning as an important dimension when 
discussing value-added contributions from investors. Regarding further research avenues, I 
believe that it would be interesting to investigate the background of US investors compared to 
European investors. Key questions might analyse: What kind of education do they have, what 
is their professional background, how much personal startup experience do they have? In 
addition, a more general analysis of differences among various thin and thick VC market 
investors might provide valuable insight for entrepreneurs when for example Asia is becoming 
a more important and apparent market for high growth ventures. 
In paper THREE we have promoted the idea that growth accelerating effects of venture capital 
are short- to mid-term, and not necessarily long-term and post-exit. Our findings suggest that 
exit route is related to subsequent growth, both in terms of magnitude and whether the startup 
continues to operate in the region. The findings are in line with the view that venture capital 
steers startups towards acquisitions (Cumming, 2008). Considering that most of the best 
performing venture capital backed Swedish startups exit by foreign acquisitions and that 
approximately half of these startups are consolidated post-exit and that the remaining 
acquired firms show slower growth, our study suggests that the growth accelerating effects of 
venture capital are short- to mid-term. The high ratio of Swedish ventures exiting on MTFs has 
been previously overlooked in research and is by itself a novel finding. Our findings indicates 
that startups going public on MTFs has a strong post-exit performance, but that these startups 
require more time to mature into successful businesses. Seeing that several of the ventures 
exiting on MTFs eventually show growth, but that growth in acquired companies often 
manifests through the acquiring companies, our findings suggest that VCs’ inclination toward 
acquisition exit might reduce the likelihood for a startup’s independent and regional growth. 
Warnings to governments not to interfere with private investors or disturb private market 
behavior (Lerner, 2009) need to be seen in this new light. Judging from the current study, 
these warnings are not sensitive to regional development perspectives. Furthermore, this study 
suggests that entrepreneurs who are in the process of raising venture capital have reasons to 
negotiate around future exit choices with the VC. If the entrepreneurs’ long term goal for 
themselves and their startup is not in line with the VC’s inclination toward acquisition exit, 
there are reasons for the entrepreneur to ensure more influence over the exit strategy.  
Conclusions open several avenues for research. We present a previously unseen post-exit 
pattern specific for venture capital funded startups. However, we cannot as yet gauge the extent 
of generalizability nor adequately explain the causality driving exit choice and post-exit 
development. For generalizability, future studies should examine exit and post-exit patterns of 
startups in additional regions and countries to provide a deeper understanding of the regional 






6.2 Practical implications 
In this section I discuss the practical implications of my research for various key stakeholders.  
6.2.1 Implications for entrepreneurs 
The main advice to entrepreneurs from this thesis is to analyze the consequences of working 
with VCs beforehand. For certain companies, venture capital might be the only possible source 
of financing. However, sometimes bootstrapping, family/friends or public grants/funding 
might be sufficient in the early stages and a better alternative than venture capital funding. 
One implication of this thesis is therefor to promote the idea that entrepreneurs (1) should 
consider whether venture capital is the right type of financing for them and (2) if they chose 
venture capital funding, to ensure that both company and founders are prepared for this 
special type of financing. 
Second, although few Swedish entrepreneurs are in the position that they can choose between 
several investors, this thesis suggests that they should try to ensure that there is a good match 
between investor and founders. Entrepreneurs should do a due diligence to understand how 
they match with the potential VC and if the VC is going to add value in addition to capital or if 
there might be possible areas of conflict. The founders will be closely connected to the people 
investing in the company for a long time and if the wrong partner and team are chosen, these 
years can become difficult. This issue is extensively covered in paper ONE. 
Third (based on paper THREE), entrepreneurs should consider the long-term effects of raising 
venture capital. The ultimate goal for a VC is the exit from the company they have invested in. 
Exits can occur in a number of ways, but the most preferred exit options for both investors and 
entrepreneurs are IPOs and acquisitions. Since acquisitions are by far the most common exit 
vehicle of these two, the entrepreneur should consider what the long-term consequences of 
acquisitions might be for themselves and their company. Acquisition often leads to a 
consolidation of some sort and a loss of main ownership and control for the entrepreneur, 
which might not be in line with the vision of the founder. Consequently, the long-term goal of 
the entrepreneur should be compared to the exit goal of the VC. A practical advice is to 
investigate various types of venture capital (e.g. business angels, governmental VCs, corporate 
VCs) to compare attitudes on exits and investment horizons. 
 
Fourth, paper TWO gives a background on how experienced entrepreneurs who have raised 
venture capital from US investors reason about the US venture capital market. The 
implications for nascent Swedish entrepreneurs is in recognizing the opportunities a large 
venture capital market can provide.  
 
 
6.2.2 Implications for venture capitalists 
 
This thesis concentrates primarily on the entrepreneur’s point of view and implications for 
policy makers but also provides certain implications for venture capitalists. 
 
As discussed in paper ONE, entrepreneurs with prior venture capital experience emphasize the 
importance of a personal and strategic fit with the investors. Consequently, for investors who 
are competing for investment opportunities, focusing more on a good relationship with the 
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founders as well as ensuring similar views on risk/return mindset, expansion plans and how 
to build a company, may help the investors to close the investment deals.  
 
In paper TWO, Swedish VCs receive knowledge on entrepreneurs’ motives to be financed by 
US investors. Several reasons are specific to the US market and are difficult for Swedish 
investors to contribute with, such as positioning for market expansion and providing niched 
technical expertise. Therefore, one practical implication of this study is that local VCs who 
focus on ventures with international growth ambitions should be open for syndication with 
larger cross-border VC actors who are able to complement the value creation contributions 
that entrepreneurs need.  
 
 
6.2.3 Implications for policy makers 
 
Although venture capitalists may accelerate startups’ growth during their involvement until 
the financial exit, less is known about how these venture capital backed startups perform long-
term and post-exit. Paper THREE presents a previously unseen post-exit pattern specific for 
venture capital funded startups. Growth accelerating effects of venture capital seem to be 
short- to mid-term, and not necessarily long-term and post-exit. If a startup’s potential growth 
manifests primarily through the acquiring corporations (e.g. closing of local business, move of 
IP or employees), it will of course matter if the acquiring firm is local or foreign. Venture capital 
may thereby be most beneficial for regions hosting a large local community of potential 
acquirers (e.g. Silicon Valley). Policy makers in regions without these conditions may thereby 
need to look into exit-centric policies. 
 
In paper TWO, we discuss implications of thin venture capital markets on entrepreneurs’ 
decision to search for investors in the US. For policy makers in thin markets trying to stimulate 
regional venture capital markets it is important to recognize that venture capital is becoming 
more global and that thin venture capital markets are to a higher degree than previous pushing 
entrepreneurs to distal venture capital funding. Policy makers need to be aware of the motives 
that drive entrepreneurs from one market to another and analyze how different policy 
instruments might be affected by these motives. 
 
Finally, several of the interviewed entrepreneurs in paper ONE and TWO had been in 
incubator or accelerator programs which were partly or fully governmental funded. Almost all 
of these founders mentioned how venture capital was discussed as “the only option” for 
funding while there was little or no focus on alternative financing sources in these programs. 
Most coaching regarding financing concentrated around pitch training to VCs and rarely 
discussed potential problems that may arise in this relationship with a VC or what founders 
should consider before raising venture capital. Therefore, one implication of this thesis is to 
promote the idea that incubators and accelerators should provide a more nuanced picture of 
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